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Individualisation at Sentencing: The Effects of Guidelines and ¶Preferred· Numbers* 
 
Over a decade after the introduction of sentencing guidelines in England and Wales, little is known about their 
effects on consistency and individualisation. Limited research has addressed the issue of consistency, and no research 
has explored another key concept, namely individualisation. This is regrettable since one criticism of guidelines is 
that they undermine the principle of individualisation at sentence, and this critique is examined here. The article 
explores two potential threats to individualisation, using sentence length data from the Crown Court Sentencing 
Survey. One threat may arise if a guideline constrains judges to sentence within a restricted range, leading to a less 
individualised approach to sentencing. The second is more fundamental, and consists of the tendency to favour some 
sentence lengths over others ² DSUHIHUHQFHIRUFHUWDLQ¶URXQG·QXPEHUV7KHDUWLFOHUHSRUWVDQDQDO\VLVRIFXVWRGLDO
sentences for assault offences. Results indicate that sentence lengths for assault offences are affected by a preference 
for certain numbers ² a tendency first observed by Francis Galton in the 19th century. On a more positive note, we 
find no evidence that the sentencing guidelines for assault and burglary introduced in 2011 have diminished the 
degree of individualisation in sentencing. We also find that courts report taking a larger number of sentencing 
factors into account under the new guidelines, further evidence that the guidelines have not undermined 
individualisation. 
Subject: sentencing 
Keywords: sentencing; individualization; sentencing guidelines 
 
Sentencing guidelines more consistent and principled sentencing. Promoting greater consistency 
may come at a cost, however. Guidelines which are excessively restrictive will achieve 
consistency, but at the expense of individualisation. To date, little research has explored the 
HIIHFWVRIWKH6HQWHQFLQJ&RXQFLO·VJXLGHOLQHVRQFRQVLVWHQF\RULQGLYLGXDOLVDWLRQ7KH&RXQFLO
routinely publishes projections of the impact of its guidelines on the prison estate.1 Yet it has yet 
to conduct research on the question of whether the guidelines have enhanced consistency. It is 
also important to address FULWLFV·2 concerns that the new guidelines format may impair 
VHQWHQFHUV·DELOLW\WRGLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQFDVHV² to individualise the sentence.3  
Academic studies have begun to fill the research void, although a systematic examination 
of the effects of the guidelines on consistency remains to be conducted. Three studies have 
H[DPLQHGWKHHIIHFWVRIWKH&RXQFLO·VILUVWguidelines (covering assault and burglary). Pina-
Sánchez analysed trends before and after the introduction of the assault guideline and found that 
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¶FRQVLVWHQF\LPSURYHGLQDOOWKHRIIHQFHVVWXGLHGDIWHUWKHQHZJXLGHOLQHFDPHLQWRIRUFH·4 Other 
studies have explored consistency in the application of the guidelines, and demonstrated that for 
several high-volume offences, the guideline factors were being applied in a consistent manner 
across courts.5 While limited in scope, these studies suggest that the English guidelines have had 
a positive effect on promoting a more consistent approach to sentencing. 
Consistent outcomes alone are insufficient to achieve justice in sentencing. A mandatory 
sentencing law which imposed a 5-year sentence on all convictions, regardless of the relative 
seriousness of individual cases, would ensure consistency but would lack a second essential 
element: individualisation. In light of the importance of both consistency and individualisation, it is 
surprising that almost all the empirical research on sentencing has explored consistency or 
sentencing disparity while neglecting individualisation in sentencing. The present research 
explored individualisation in the Crown Court. More specifically, we addressed two potential 
threats to individualisation, one arising from the implementation of guidelines, and another -- of 
a more fundamental nature -- which relates to the psychology of decision-making. 
 
7KUHDWVWRLQGLYLGXDOLVDWLRQD6HQWHQFLQJ*XLGHOLQHVDQGE¶3HQDO&OXVWHULQJ· 
Tensions may arise when a system attempts to maximize both consistency and individualisation. 
For example, the grid-based sentencing guidelines found in many US jurisdictions (including 
Minnesota and Pennsylvania), employ a two-dimensional structure. Crime seriousness constitutes 
one dimension and criminal history the other; the grid provides a range of sentence for each cell 
of the grid. Thus, under the Minnesota standard grid, a conviction for a seriousness level six 
offence for an offender in criminal history category three carries a sentence range of 34 to 46 
months.6 &RXUWVPXVWLPSRVHDVHQWHQFHZLWKLQWKLVUDQJHRUILQG¶VXEVWDQWLDODQGFRPSHOOLQJ·
reasons to justify a departure from the guidelines. Since a single grid is used, all offences7 must 
be assigned to one of only eleven offence seriousness levels. Given that there are many hundreds 
of criminal offenses in Minnesota, crimes of variable seriousness will be assigned the same level 
of gravity in the grid. This arrangement enhances the consistency of outcomes, yet a loss of 
individualisation may result.  
(a) The English sentencing guidelines 
Sentencing guidelines in England and Wales take a different approach. The guidelines require 
courts to follow a clearly-articulated methodology which allows sentencers considerable 
discretion within that structure, as well as the power to depart from the guidelines when it would 
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be in the interests of justice to do so. Definitive sentencing guidelines were first introduced in 
England and Wales in 2004.8 Since then, offence-specific guidelines have been issued for the 
most common crimes. As with the US schemes, the goal of these guidelines is to promote a 
more consistent approach to senetncing. The guidelines provide more restrictive sentence ranges 
than those established by statutory maxima.9 For example, although the statutory maximum for 
DVVDXOWRFFDVLRQLQJDFWXDOERGLO\KDUPLVILYH\HDUV·LPSULVRQPHQW10, the ceiling of the guideline 
range is only three years. Assuming that courts sentence within the guideline range, the 
distribution of sentence lengths is restricted ² unless a court elects to depart from the guideline 
by invoking the interests of justice provision.11 Under such a guideline, judges may be less likely 
to use the full range of their discretion.  
The English guidelines do not assign crimes to a small number of seriousness levels (as is 
the case in Minnesota); each offence has its own separate guideline. In 2011, the Sentencing 
Council issued a new-format guideline.12 The previous assault guideline focused on forms of 
specific conduct and SURYLGHGIHZVHQWHQFLQJIDFWRUV7KH&RXQFLO·VQHZIRUPDWJXLGHOLQHZDV
designed to provide greater guidance, principally be moving away from specific assaultive acts 
and by providing a clear, step-by-step methodology. Key to this methodology is a two-step 
approach to considering factors relevant to harm, culpability and more generally, aggravating and 
mitigating factors. By specifying the factors to be considered, and by restricting the range of 
sentence, the guidelines aim to enhance consistency across courts, but might the English 
guidelines have resulted in less individualisation? For several assault offences13 the new format 
guideline provides fewer categories (three rather than four), each with its own starting point and 
ranges. Under the new format, individualisation may have suffered as courts assigned the same 
number of cases to fewer categories. 
Individualisation at sentencing requires a court to differentiate among cases to reflect 
important individual characteristics relating to the offence and the offender. The introduction of 
the new assault offences guideline14 may have had one of two effects. By imposing tighter 
sentence ranges and by requiring cases to be assigned to one of three categories, the guideline 
may have resulted in less individualised outcomes ² through the mechanism noted earlier (cases 
RIYDULDEOHVHULRXVQHVVEHLQJ¶VTXHH]HG·LQWRWKHVDPHJXLGHOLQHFDWHJRU\DQGKHQFHWKHVDPH
range of sentence). On the other hand, by enumerating and highlighting important factors 
relating to the case (e.g., harm, offender culpability, personal mitigation) the guideline may have 
promoted greater differentiation among cases, thereby increasing individualisation. More or less 
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individualisation? That is the question, and the answer is fundamental to the success and future 
of the guidelines.  
7KH&RXQFLO·VQHZguideline format has been adapted for subsequent guidelines,15 so 
findings from the first two guidelines will carry lessons for other offence-specific guidelines 
which are subject to a similar structure. In addition, since the US grid-based approach to 
guidelines has been rejected in all other countries, the English guidelines represent the principal 
model for countries seeking to introduce greater structure to their sentencing.16 These findings 
will therefore have relevance for other jurisdictions which have indicated an intention to adopt 
sentencing guidelines.17  
(b)  Preferred sentences, or penal clustering 
The second potential threat to individualised sentencing concerns the phenomenology of 
decision-making. If sentencing were determined by a computer capable of detecting and 
accounting for all legally-relevant (and only legally-relevant) factors, we would expect clear 
separation of cases along the dimension of severity (as measured by sentence length). This could 
be represented graphically by a smooth relationship between two dimensions, namely, sentence 
length and crime seriousness. The computer would have no a priori preference for any specific 
VHQWHQFHOHQJWKVDQGZRXOGEHLQGLIIHUHQWWRWKHDSSHDORI¶URXQGQXPEHUV·+XPDQGHFLVLRQ-
makers, however, are likely to be influenced by the intuitive appeal of, say, one year over a term 
of 13 or 11 months, or 4 years rather than 50 months. A sentencer contemplating imposing a 
term of custody in the 10 to 14 month range may be more likely to settle on a year, and this 
means that some cases receiving this sentence merited less or more time in prison than exactly 
one year. The consequence is what we call Penal Clustering18 -- the tendency of courts to favour 
certain, specific sentence lengths. Penal clustering is the equivalent of a university marking 
distribution with, say, 24 possible marks (running from F up to A+) but where three marks ² A, 
B, or C ² account for almost all marks assigned. 
The 19th century statistician, Sir Francis Galton, noted this phenomenon in a prescient 
article published in Nature over a century ago. Galton drew attention, for the first time, to the 
fact that certain custodial sentence lengths were used by judges19 very frequently, while others 
were rarely LPSRVHG%HJLQQLQJZLWKWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDW´WHUPVRILPSULVRQPHQWDZDUGHGE\ 
MXGJHVVKRXOGIDOOLQWRDFRQWLQXRXVVHULHVµ20 Galton found that some sentence lengths were very 
popular, while others were never imposed. For example, a sentence of five years was 20 times 
PRUHOLNHO\WKDQDVHQWHQFHRIVL[\HDUVDQGWKLV´H[WUHPHLUUHJXODULW\µFRXOGQRWEHH[SODLQHGE\
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any legally-relevant circumstance. Galton argued that the human preference for particular 
QXPEHUVWKHQFRQYHUWHGLQWRIL[HGVHQWHQFHVRILPSULVRQPHQW´LQWHUIHUHVZLWKWKHRUGHUO\
distribution of punishment in conformity ZLWKSHQDOGHVHUWVµ21. The appeal of certain sentence 
OHQJWKVXQGHUPLQHGDFRXUW·VDELOLW\WRPDNHILQHUGLVWLQFWLRQVEDVHGRQGLIIHUHQFHVLQFULPH
seriousness. In short, this preference for certain numbers impaired individualisation.  
The only subsequent empirical analyses of preferred sentence patterns in England were 
conducted and reported by Pease and colleagues over 30 years ago.22 Since then, however, no 
further research has been conducted on this issue, and much has changed, including the 
inception of sentencing guidelines. Ashworth23 has suggested that the tendency to cluster exists 
today, but there has been no empirical test of this assertion. This article explores the extent to 
which the phenomenon that Galton identified all those years ago is still present in English 
sentencing.24  We addressed two principal questions relating to individualisation in sentencing: 
x 'RFRXUWVXVHDZLGHUDQJHRIFXVWRGLDOVHQWHQFHOHQJWKVRULVWKHUHHYLGHQFHRI¶SHQDO
FOXVWHULQJ·25  around a limited number of specific lengths?  
x Did the introduction of the new assault offences guideline (in 2011) or the burglary 
offence guideline (2012), both of which aimed to promote greater consistency, adversely 
affect individualisation? 
 
Method 
Measuring penal clustering and individualisation in sentencing 
Our measure of penal clustering is the degree to which sentences of imprisonment spread smoothly 
across the range of available sentence lengths ² the measure adopted by Galton in his 19th 
century research. Individualisation is a more challenging concept, both to define and measure. 
There has been no scholarship on this dimension of sentencing, and for this reason we adopt a 
relatively straightforward measure. We employ two measures of individualisation: (i) the number 
of unique sentence lengths arising from the distribution of all custodial sentences imposed; and 
(ii) the proportion of all cases falling into the most frequently-imposed unique sentence lengths. 26 
We assume that a distribution lacking individualisation would have fewer unique sentences than 
one in which individualisation is present.  
It is important to note that these measures are not simply the opposite of variability. Two 
GLVWULEXWLRQVRIQXPEHUVPD\KDYHWKHVDPH¶VSUHDG·RUYDULDELOLW\EXWYHU\GLIIHUHQWGHJUHHVRI
individualisation. For example, consider these two illustrative distributions of sentence lengths: 
x:  = .5,.5,1,1,1,1,1,1,1.5,1.5 and y = .5,.6,.7,.8,.9,1,1.1,1.2,1.3,1.4,1.5. These distributions have the 
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same spread of numbers but the latter has more unique lengths, and therefore greater 
individualisation. A distribution of sentence lengths lacking individualisation would require only a 
small number of specific sentence lengths to capture all cases. If the new guideline has 
constrained individualisation, more cases will fall into a smaller number of unique sentences. The 
distribution of sentences will be captured by fewer sentences.  
Two further measures related to individualisation at sentencing addressed other concerns 
about the guidelines. It may be argued that applying a guideline with three levels leads courts to 
overlook the diversity of sentencing factors present in a case. For this reason we compared the 
number of aggravating and mitigating factors taken into account under the old and new 
guideline. In addition, we tested the hypothesis that mitigation plays a diminished role under the 
&RXQFLO·VQHZIRUPDW guidelines.27 We compared the number of mitigating factors cited by 
courts before and after introduction of the guideline to see if the guideline had reduced the 
number of factors being employed by courts.  
Data Source 
The data are drawn from the Crown Court Sentencing Survey (CCSS) administered by the 
Sentencing Council. Between 2011 and 2015, sentencers in the Crown Court were required to 
complete a data return every time they sentenced an offender.28 The analyses draw upon data 
from 2011 and 2012 (the years relevant to determining the impact of the new format guidelines). 
The analysis is restricted to cases receiving an immediate custodial sentence since sentence length 
(in days) constitutes our principal variable of analysis in the exploration of individualisation and 
penal clustering. We compared the degree of clustering generally, and then determined whether 
there was any change following the introduction of the new guidelines. 
 
Findings 
(a) Penal clustering 
Before examining the evidence for penal clustering, we note an obvious manifestation of the 
appeal of one category of numbers. Of all custodial terms imposed for assault, fully three-
quarters involved an even rather than an odd number of months.29 This anomalous statistical 
pattern reveals the influence of cognitive biases on the determination of sentence and marks the 
distribution as deriving from a human decision-maker. The preference for even numbers has 
been well-documented in a range of decision-making contexts,30 and these data show that the 
proclivity for one category of numbers influences sentencing decisions as well.  
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We now present the distribution of sentence lengths imposed in the 6,743 cases of 
assault sentenced to immediate custody in 2011, in order to evaluate the degree to which 
sentences cluster around certain, specific lengths. This distribution is represented graphically in 
Figure 1 which reveals that a high volume of cases cluster within a small number of unique 
sentence lengths. Although the cases are distributed across 194 different sentences, most were 
concentrated within a few specific lengths. The ten most frequently-imposed sentences capture 
over half (56%) of the total sample. Indeed, five sentences (1 year; 1.5 years; 2 years; 6 months; 8 
months) account for almost 40% of all custodial sentences. The single most frequent outcome 
(one year) accounted for 13% of cases, as can be seen in Table 1.  
Focusing on a more restricted band of sentence lengths highlights the clustering effect. 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of specific sentences within the range from 310 to 410 days. 
Although sentencers may choose from 100 unique sentences within this range, over 90% of the 
sentences imposed were exactly 360 days. A further 4% were 330 days and 2.2% were 312 days. 
Thus, only three unique sentences were necessary to account for 97% of all cases sentenced 
within this broad range of sentence lengths. 
 
Insert Figure 1, Figure 2 and Table 1 here 
Offence-specific sentences 
It is possible that clustering only emerges when the court has a serious offence which may result 
in a sentence within a very broad range. To explore this possibility, we compared a more serious 
assault offence (Causing grievous bodily harm with intent to do grievous harm, hereafter GBH31) 
and a less serious offence (Assault occasioning actual bodily harm, hereafter ABH32). Assault 
offences share certain commonalities and are grouped under the same sentencing guideline, but 
there are great differences in terms of harm and culpability (reflected in the guideline ranges). 
The more serious offence of GBH carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment and a 
guideline maximum of 16 years; significantly higher than the 5-year maximum and 3-year 
guideline ceiling for ABH.33 
First, we document the degree of clustering in sentences imposed for GBH. The sample 
now contains 1,526 sentences of immediate custody. Once again, clustering was evident, and to a 
greater degree than in the total assault sample. As can be seen in Table 2, the ten most frequent 
sentences encompass almost three-quarters (71%) of all sentenced cases. Furthermore, 
expanding this list to include the 19 most frequent sentences captures more than nine out of ten 
cases (91%). Only three specific sentences (1 year; 2 years and 18 months) are necessary to 
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accommodate almost four cases in ten. We then repeated the analysis for the less serious offence 
of ABH, and found a comparable degree of clustering. There were 2,291 sentences imposed for 
this offence, with 111 unique outcomes. The ten most frequent outcomes accounted for fully 
70% of all sentences. Clustering thus occurs regardless of the seriousness of the crime. 
Insert Table 2 here 
Clustering/spreading by court 
To address the question of whether there is significant variation in the degree of clustering in 
different courts across the country, we use as an index of clustering the number of specific 
sentences imposed divided by the number of cases sentenced. Thus, a court which sentenced 10 
FDVHVDQGXVHGVSHFLILFVHQWHQFHVUHSUHVHQWV]HURFOXVWHULQJDQGDSHUIHFWGHJUHHRI¶VSUHDG·
with a spread factor of 1.00. A court that sentenced 40 cases and used only 8 unique sentences 
would represent a low spread, high cluster score (.20). We ranked the Crown Court centres 
across the country regarding WKHGHJUHHWRZKLFKWKH\¶FOXVWHU·WKHLUSULVRQVHQWHQFHV² as 
UHSUHVHQWHGE\WKH¶VSUHDG·IDFWRU7KHUHZDVFRQVLGHUDEOHUDQJHLQWKHGHJUHHWRZKLFKFRXUWV
¶FOXVWHU·1RWsurprisingly, courts sentencing more cases employed more unique sentences. 
However, variability in the degree of clustering did emerge, even after controlling for the number 
of cases sentenced. For example, in Swansea, 30 cases were assigned to one of 19 unique 
sentences, while in Leeds, the same number of cases were assigned to fewer unique sentences 
(13) suggesting greater clustering in the latter court.34 
7KHVHDQDO\VHVVKRZWKDWVHQWHQFHUVGUDZXSRQDVPDOOQXPEHURI¶SRSXODU·VHQWHQFHV
The threat to individualisation in sentencing observed by Galton in the courts of Victorian 
England persists today. The pattern of clustered terms of imprisonment is unexpected since the 
sentencing guidelines in England and Wales do not prescribe specific outcomes (but rather 
sentence ranges, leaving courts free to choose the actual sentence). Clustering would be expected 
in a jurisdiction with many mandatory sentences since these, by definition, require a court to 
cluster cases at a specific sentence. There are no such mandatory sentences for assault offences, 
however, and so this cannot explain the pattern of results which must be attributed to judicial 
rather than legislative decision-making. Whatever the explanation for the constrained distribution 
DULVLQJIURPFRXUWV·SUHIHUHQFHVIRUFHUWDLQVHQWHQFHVWKHFRQVHTXHQFHLVDUHVWULFWLRQRQ
individualisation.  
At this point, we examine the effect of the &RXQFLO·Vnew format guidelines on clustering 
and the use of sentencing factors. 
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(b) Assessing the impact of the new format Guidelines on individualisation 
Since data are available for the period before the new guideline came into force, it is possible to 
evaluate the effect of the introduction of the new assault offences guideline in June 2011, and the 
burglary guideline of January 2012.35 As noted, the new guidelines sought to improve the 
structure and coherence of the old guideline, with a view to promoting greater consistency.36  
  Examining all assault sentences imposed after the introduction of the new guideline, we 
find that matters improved in terms of our measure of individualisation in sentencing. After the 
implementation of the guideline we observe more, not fewer, specific sentence lengths being 
imposed. There were 2,666 cases recorded in the pre-guideline phase and 3,011 in the post-
implementation period, yet the number of specific sentence lengths was approximately the same 
(146 vs 145). Equating the two samples in terms of the number of cases reveals that, in the post-
guideline phase, the proportion of sentences encompassed by the 10 and 20 most common 
outcomes decreased, from 58.3% to 53.7% and from 79.3% to 76.1%; these pre-post 
implementation differences are statistically significant; there is less than one chance in 100 that 
they could have arisen as a result of random variation.37  
  In other words, greater individualisation was observed following implementation of the 
new guideline. This finding is striking because it includes data from only the first year following 
introduction of the new guideline. It is reasonable to expect a new guideline to take at least a year 
WR¶EHGGRZQ·² and to achieve its anticipated effect on trial court sentencing practices. Yet these 
data reveal statistically significant effects on individualisation within 12 months. We also tested 
the hypothesis that the new guideline for domestic burglary, introduced in 2012 reduced the 
degree of individualisation relative to the year previously. Consistent with the findings for assault, 
the results indicated no loss of individualization following the introduction of this guideline.38 
   
Effects of the Guidelines on the use of sentencing factors 
With respect to sentencing factors we also found no evidence of loss of judicial sensitivity to 
individual sentencing factors. In fact, the new format assault guideline had the opposite effect. 
Under the old assault guideline, an average of 3.65 sentencing factors were recorded across all 
cases. This average rose to 4.67 under the new assault guideline, a statistically significant increase. 
The effect presumably reflects the fact that the new format assault guidelines enumerate up to 50 
factors. In contrast, the previous guidelines contained only a few common factors besides the 
type of activity comprising the assault, directing courts instead to consult the generic guideline 
for determining offence seriousness. Thus the previous guideline for section 18 assaults 
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contained only a single additional sentencing factor (provocation) in addition to the seven factors 
common to all assaults. In contrast, the new guideline for this offence contains 50 sentencing 
factors relating to harm, culpability, seriousness or personal mitigation.39  
  Analysis of responses to the Crown Court survey revealed no reduction in the number of 
mitigating factors cited by courts following introduction of the guideline; the average number 
rose slightly from 1.24 to 1.33. Further analyses revealed that the number of aggravating factors 
increased to a greater extent than the number of mitigating factors, reflecting possibly the greater 
number of aggravating factors listed in the guidelines.40 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
This empirical research explored two potential threats to individualisation at sentencing: a 
tendency to impose certain sentence lengths; and the introduction of the new format guidelines ² 
both of which may have further compressed different cases into a restricted number of 
sentences. Regarding the first issue, we demonstrated that despite the discretion that sentencers 
exercise in England and Wales, many custodial sentences imposed for assault are assigned to one 
of a restricted number of sentence lengths. The consequence is that the principle of 
individualisation is constrained. In his 1895 article, Galton concluded with, in his words, a little 
¶PRUDOLVLQJ·41 +HGHFULHGWKHIDFWWKDW¶LUUHOHYDQWLQIOXHQFHV·VXFKDVWKH¶XQFRQVFLRXVIDYRXURU
GLVIDYRXUIHOWIRUSDUWLFXODUQXPEHUV·affects the choice of sentences of imprisonment. The 
phenomenon of penal clustering represents a threat to individualisation to the extent that a one-
year sentence draws in cases which merit a shorter (or longer) sentence.42 The consequence is a 
degree of unfairness in sentencing outcomes. If a court unconsciously43 ¶URXQGVXS·DVHQWHQFHRI
imprisonment, the offender is effectively serving time in prison for which no justification exists.  
One way of counteracting this procrustean tendency by courts would be to sensitize 
VHQWHQFHUVWRWKHSKHQRPHQRQDQGWRHQFRXUDJHWKHPWRVHQWHQFHZLWKRXWUHJDUGWR¶URXQG·RU
appealing numbers (such as one or two years). This might involve providing them with feedback 
on the distribution of sentence lengths imposed. Such remedial initiatives could target the courts 
which display the greatest degree of penal clustering. A second remedy would involve re-writing 
the guidelines so that sentence lengths are expressed in months, at least up to some limit (such as 
three or five years). This may also reduce the tendency to cluster around specific round numbers 
such as 12 months. Finally, guidance to sentencers to the effect that there is a presumption to 
¶URXQGGRZQ·ZKHQGHWHUPLQLQJVHQWHQFHOHQJWKVPD\PLWLJDWHDQ\¶URXQGLQJXS·WHQGHQF\ 
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Our conclusion regarding the other potential threat to individualised sentencing is more 
positive. Previous research has demonstrated an increase in consistency following the 
LQWURGXFWLRQRIWKH&RXQFLO·VILUVWJXLGHOLQHV44 and, in this paper, we have demonstrated that this 
has not come at the price of diminished individualisation ² at least for the first two guidelines 
issued by the Council, covering assault and burglary offences. This suggests that sentencing 
reform is not a zero-sum game; guidelines can enhance consistency without impairing 
individualisation. Assuming that these findings apply to other offences for which guidelines 
apply, we conclude that sentencing in England and Wales has not become less individualised as a 
result of the introduction of the new format guidelines.  
Jurisdictions contemplating the adoption of a sentencing guidelines scheme will need to 
know exactly how a guideline may enhance individualisation. One explanation returns us to the 
structure of the guideline which requires courts to consider individually a range of sentencing 
factors. A court sentencing without a guideline will have only submissions from the advocates to 
guide their application of principles and consideration of mitigating and aggravating factors. In 
contrast, the guidelines require sentencers to work their way systematically through all steps of 
the guideline. This requirement may sensitize courts to important differences between cases, 
resulting in the use of a higher number of unique sentences. A second possibility is that 
sentencers simply take longer to sentence a case when applying a guideline with nine steps. The 
guideline requires courts to consider each step, and to review its lists of aggravating and 
mitigating factors. This may provoke a deeper consideration of the case characteristics, 
generating greater discrimination between cases ² and more unique sentence outcomes. 
Replication of the enhanced individualisation effect with the other offence-specific guidelines 
would confirm or disconfirm these explanatory hypotheses. 
Finally, the trends on the use of sentencing factors suggest another general lesson. By 
identifying the principal aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors a guideline promotes a 
more consistent approach to considering these factors, and as we found with respect to the 
assault guideline, enumerating factors leads courts to take more factors into account, and thus to 
further promote an individualised approach to sentencing. 
 
Data Limitations and Future research 
These data derive from the Crown Court; the Sentencing Council has yet to collect comparable 
GDWDLQWKHPDJLVWUDWHV·FRXUWs. The findings, therefore, cannot automatically be generalized to 
the lower level of jurisdiction. However, we see no reason to suppose that the clustering and the 
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improvement in individualisation for assault sentences reported here would not be replicated in 
WKHPDJLVWUDWHV·FRXrts: The guidelines apply to all courts.  
This research, and the preceding studies on consistency, represents a small step towards a 
comprehensive understanding of the impact of the English sentencing guidelines. More research 
is needed45, and we also HFKRRWKHUV·DSSHDOVIRUTXDOLWDWLYHUHVHDUFKLQWRWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKH
guidelines, including analysis of sentencing remarks.46 Future research needs to employ other 
measures of individualisation in order to explore the effects of guidelines on sentencing 
decisions. As recently as eight years ago courts in England and Wales sentenced offenders guided 
only by appellate decisions and the submissions of advocates. Today, WKH\¶PXVWIROORZ·47 
detailed offence-VSHFLILFDQG¶JHQHULF·JXLGHOLQHV8QGHUVWDQGLQJWKHLPSDFWRIWKLVPRUH
structured approach to sentencing remains a priority for sentencing scholars, and indeed the 
Sentencing Council itself. The other countries considering adopting some form of sentencing 
guidelines would also benefit from research upon the first jurisdiction to introduce statutorily 
based, offence-specific sentencing guidelines.
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Figure 1 
Distribution of custodial sentence lengths for cases of assault, 2011 
 
Figure 2 
Proportion of sentences falling within the (310-410) day range 
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Table 1 
Most frequent custodial sentence lengths (in days), all assault cases, 2011 
 
Sentence 
Length (in 
days) 
360 540 720 180 240 270 480 450 300 1,080 
% of cases 
in each 
sentence 
length 
category 
 
 
13% 7% 6% 6% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 
 
3% 
  
Source: Crown Court Sentencing Survey (CCSS); percentages rounded 
 
Table 2 
Most frequent custodial sentence lengths (in days), GBH and ABH Offences, 2011 
 
GBH 
Sentence 
length 
(in days) 
360 720 540 480 600 450 900 1,080 630 420 
% of 
cases in 
each 
sentence 
length 
14% 12% 10% 7% 6% 6% 5% 5% 3% 3% 
ABH 
Sentence 
length 
(in days) 
360 240 180 540 270 720 300 480 450 600 
% of 
cases in 
each 
sentence 
length 
16% 8% 8% 7% 7% 7% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Source: Crown Court Sentencing Survey (CCSS); percentages rounded 
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MRXUQDO·VUHYLHZHUVfor comments on an earlier draft. Views expressed herein are solely those of 
the authors. 
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